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Abstract
Bayesian inference — although becoming popular in physics and chemistry —
is hampered up to now by the vagueness of its notion of prior probability.
Some of its supporters argue that this vagueness is the unavoidable conse-
quence of the subjectivity of judgements — even scientific ones. We argue
that priors can be defined uniquely if the statistical model at hand posses
a symmetry and if the ensuing confidence intervals are subjected to a fre-
quentist criterion. Moreover, it is shown via an example taken from recent
experimental nuclear physics, that this procedure can be extended to models
with broken symmetry.
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INTRODUCTION
Bayesian inference is becoming popular in the physical sciences. It finds eloquent and
noteworthy defenders [1,2], it is treated in a growing number of textbooks [3–7], an annual
series of conferences [8] as well as numerous articles report on its applications. Even the
“Guide to the expression of uncertainty in measurement” [9] supported by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Bureau International des Poids et Me´sures
(BIPM) and other international organizations implicitly favors Bayesian statistics — as
D‘Agostini points out (in Secs. 2.2 and 14.2 of [2]). Some authors that have collaborated in
the formulation of the Guide [9] and of the German standard [10], adhere in their publications
to “a Bayesian theory of measurement uncertainty” [11]. The change of paradigm from
frequentist to Bayesian statistics (for this antagonism see e.g. the introduction of [11] and
ch. 7 of [12]) is taking place despite the fact, that the disturbing vagueness of Bayesian prior
probabilities persists up to now. D‘Agostini [2] eloquently holds that the prior probabilities
are the mathematical representation of an unavoidable subjectivity of judgments — even
of scientific ones. In our opinion, however, a criterion exists that prior probabilities should
meet — at least approximately — and which in many cases does not leave any freedom
in their choice. This criterion is a consequence of the fact that Bayesian inference has
a frequentist interpretation — as will be explained below. This fact has been pointed
out earlier (by Welch, Peers, Stein and Villegas [13–17]) in the literature of mathematical
statistics but it seems rarely known in practice. In the present note, the criterion is described
as well as the circumstances under which it is met. They amount to the existence of a
symmetry of the model that states the relation between event and hypothesis. The Bayesian
prior is then a Haar measure of the symmetry group. By helps of a realistic example taken
from current nuclear physics it is shown that this procedure can be extended to the usual
case of models with broken symmetry. Finally the same example shows that the popular
likelihood method — as described in [18]— yields confidence intervals of lower reliability
than the Bayesian procedure.
BAYESIAN STATISTICS
Bayesian statistics is a very useful tool for statistical inference. Let x denote the con-
tinuous event and ξ the continuous hypotheses. Suppose that the conditional probability
p(x|ξ)dx — the above mentioned model — as well as the event x are given. The problem
of statistical inference is: What can we learn from x about ξ? The Bayesian answer [19]
is a conditional probability P for ξ given x which can be expressed in terms of the given
distribution p,
P (ξ|x)dξ = p(x|ξ)µ(ξ)∫
dξ′ p(x|ξ′)µ(ξ′)dξ. (1)
Here, µ(ξ) is the prior distribution assigned to ξ in the absence of or “prior to” any ex-
perimental evidence. Hence, Bayesian statistics relies on the assumption that µ(ξ) is a
meaningful object.
The choice of the prior is the problem of Bayesian theory, because it is not clear what
we can know “prior” about ξ.
2
SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION
The view held e.g. in the recent article by D’Agostini [2] or the recent textbook by
Howson and Urbach [6] is that the choice of µ(ξ) should be left to the good taste and the
experience of the scientist analyzing the event x. They argue that a such a subjective element
should be in any honest theory of inference since it makes explicit the subjectivity of any
judgement — including the scientific ones: nothing can be known about ξ in an objective
way prior to the event. In subjective interpretation Bayesian probabilities reflect personal
confidence in hypotheses. It can be expressed in bets (see [6]).
This view does in principle not preclude objectivity altogether: Objectivity exists as the
limiting consequence of an infinite number of recorded events. Indeed one can show that in
this limit Bayesian inference becomes independent of µ(ξ) in the sense that p(x|ξ) then tends
towards a δ-distribution with respect to ξ — centered at the true value ξˆ of the hypothesis.
OBJECTIVE BAYESIAN STATISTICS
The subjective interpretation — taken literally and without appealing to some common
sense — allows anything. This is obvious from eq. (1): if one is free to choose µ(ξ), one can
generate any P (ξ|x) — given a finite number of events. To avoid this, we prefer to look for
some criterion that would severely restrict the class of allowed priors. Fortunately there is
a very natural one.
Consider a Bayesian confidence area A(x, C). It shall satisfy∫
A(x,C)
dξ P (ξ|x) ≡ C, (2)
which is usually stated in the form: “given the event x, the hypothesis lies with confidence
C in the area A”. We want to reformulate this in a way which turns the vague notion of
confidence into probability and by the same token defines the desired criterion.
Imagine an ensemble X of events x with relative frequencies p(x|ξˆ)dx. Let x run over the
ensemble and suppose that from every x the confidence area A(x, C) is derived in a unique
way, e.g. by determing the smallest one. This yields an ensemble of confidence areas. The
criterion then is: The prior must lead to an ensemble of confidence areas such that they
cover the true value ξˆ with probability C.
Since this gedanken experiment — which can even be realized via Monte Carlo simula-
tion — equates C with a well defined frequency (to cover ξˆ), the criterion turns confidence
into frequentist probability. In short: We require that Bayesian confidence areas are fre-
quentist confidence areas. It is proven in the mathematical literature [14] that this criterion
can be met exactly: Let the conditional probability p(x|ξ)dx be invariant under a Lie group
G represented as transformations of x and ξ, i.e.
p(x|ξ)dx = p(Gρx|Gρξ)dGρx, Gρ ∈ G, (3)
suppose furthermore that the definition of the confidence area A is invariant under G, i.e
A(Gρx, C) = GρA(x, C), (4)
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then the right Haar measure of the symmetry group is a suitable prior in the sense of the
criterion. It is necessary for this, that the hypothesis can be identified with the symmetry
group of the conditional probability, i.e. for every two hypotheses ξ1,ξ2 there must be exactly
one transformation Gρ ∈ G such that ξ1 = Gρξ2. Then the uniqueness of the right Haar
measure implies the uniqueness of the prior and one has
µ(ξ) =
[
∂Gρξ
∂ρ
∣∣∣∣
ρ=0
]−1
, (5)
which is the inverse Jacobian of the transformation Gρ taken at the unit element of the
group.
Note that the very interesting case of A to be the smallest area of confidence C, satisfies
eq. (4), if the volume of A is determined by help of the measure that is invariant under G,
i.e. the left Haar measure.
The prior distribution is not independent of the statistical model; rather it is defined
by the structure of the model (see [16,20]). It is prior to the observations. Since the above
symmetry uniquely defines the prior and since it ensures a frequentist interpretation of
Bayesian confidence intervals and since frequentist probability is often termed “objective”
probability, one may call the present procedure objective Bayesian statistics. However, we
return to the word “Bayesian” implying for the rest of the paper the qualification “objective”.
By the following example, we show that this concept can be extended to models that lack
the symmetry (3).
EXAMPLE
The measurement problems encountered in science, often do not have a symmetry (3).
However, Bayesian inference based on a multi-dimensional event can usually be broken down
into a succession of Bayesian arguments on more elementary events until a starting point
that possesses a symmetry has been found. To be definite let us consider the parity violating
matrix elements measured by the TRIPLE collaboration in resonant p-wave scattering of
polarized neutrons on heavy nuclei [21–24]. For the present purpose it is not necessary to
understand the details of those experiments. It suffices to know that the parity violating
matrix elements — the events — have the Gaussian probability
g(x|
√
M2 + ε2)dx =
dx√
2pi(M2 + ε2)
exp
(
−1
2
x2
M2 + ε2
)
(6)
where ε is an experimental error — supposed to be given — and M is the root mean
square parity violating matrix element. The latter one is the “hypothesis” to be determined.
There is no symmetry (3) relating x and M . However, the probability of eq. (6) remains
invariant under simultaneous change of the scale of x and ξ =
√
M2 + ε2. Hence, Bayesian
inference should be done with respect to ξ rather than M . Afterwards — when the posterior
distribution of ξ has been constructed — one can derive statements about M . E.g. one can
decide whether with sufficiently high confidence ξ is larger than ε and thus M > 0. The
symmetry considerations require
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µ(ξ) =
1
ξ
(7)
as prior, which is the Haar measure of the Lie group of scale changes.
The problem of [21–24] is complicated by the fact, that one usually does not know the
total angular momentum of the p-wave resonance. Only p1/2 resonances can show parity
violation. If the event x is gathered in a p3/2 resonance nothing can be learned about M
and the distribution of the event is g(x|ε). One knows, however, the probability qp of the
occurrence of p1/2 resonances. Again it is not necessary to discuss here the contents of
nuclear physics that create this complication. It suffices to state, that the event x follows
with probability qp the distribution g(x|ξ) and with probability 1−qp the distribution g(x|ε),
so that one has
p(x|ξ) = qpg(x|ξ) + (1 − qp)g(x|ε).
The presence of the second term on the right hand side precludes any symmetry (3) relating
x and ξ — except in the limit of ε→ 0 when g(x|ε)→ δ(x) and p(x|ξ) recovers the symmetry
under scale changes. The full experiment of [21–24] probes n resonances i = 1, . . . , n under
varying experimental conditions, so that ε = εi becomes a function of the resonance i. This
alone precludes any symmetry of the multidimensional problem.
If, however, one knows for one of the resonances that it is a p1/2 case, say for i = 1,
then the event measured there has the distribution g(x1|ξ); the symmetry is scale-invariance
and the prior is (7); one can use the event x1 to construct the Bayesian inverse P1(ξ|x1); it
can be injected as prior distribution into the analysis of the results at i = 2, . . . , n. This
procedure leads to a posterior distribution P (ξ|x1, . . . , xn). In this way, one finds a starting
point of the whole analysis which has a well defined symmetry and therefore a well defined
prior. Let us call the whole procedure an approximate Bayesian (AB) one.
It is not our purpose to reanalyze the data of refs. [21–24]. We only want to demonstrate,
that the AB analysis satisfies the criterion described above to a good approximation. For the
purpose of this, the AB analysis has been subjected to a Monte Carlo test with parameters
close to those of the experimental cases [21–24]. The number of resonances was chosen to be
n = 15. The errors εi, i = 1, . . . , 15 have been drawn from an exponential distribution with
mean value rMˆ . This allows one to study (on fig. 1) the result as a function of r = ε¯/Mˆ —
the mean error relative to the true value Mˆ of the r.m.s. parity violating matrix element. In
the experiments [21–24], r ranged from 0.23 up to the order of unity. The coordinates xi of
the event x = (x1, . . . , x15) were generated in two steps. First one decides with probability
qp =
1
3
, whether the quantity xi should belong to the p1/2-wave resonances. If yes then xi was
drawn from an ensemble with distribution g(xi|
√
Mˆ2 + ε2i ), else the distribution g(xi|εi) was
applied. The vector x — without the information from which of the two ensembles anyone
of the xi comes — is equivalent to the experimental “event”.
The event x was analyzed by assuming that the “resonance” im, where the maximum of
the ratio xi/εi occurs, is a p1/2 resonance and can serve as the starting point of the analysis
in the above sense. By help of the posterior distribution P (ξ|x), the shortest confidence
interval (ξ<, ξ>) was found such that∫ ξ>
ξ<
dηP (η|x1, . . . , xn) = 0.68
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and it was recorded whether the true value Mˆ was
inside (max(0,
√
ξ2< − ε21),max(0,
√
ξ2> − ε21)). This procedure was applied to 104 vectors
x. On fig. 1, the symbols labeled “Bayes” give the relative frequency of “success”, i.e the
probability to find Mˆ in the above mentioned range performed for different r which controls
the experimental error. In this way, the curve on the figure was generated. (The full and
dashed lines are 4th order polynomials fit to the points). Because of the lack of symmetry,
the result is not identical but only close to 0.68 (the dotted line). However, in the limit of
r → 0 which means εi → 0 for all i, the criterion is obeyed exactly — as it should be, since
scale invariance is recovered in this limit.
FIG. 1. Bayesian inference is superior to the likelihood method: The frequency of the true
value of the parity violating matrix element to lie in the 68%-confidence interval is plotted against
the size of the experimental error. Details are explained in the text.
In comparison, a “likelihood” analysis was performed. This type of analysis is very
popular. It amounts to the Bayesian procedure with the prior distribution set constant.
In the present case, we had to cut off the posterior distribution for M ≫ Mˆ in order to
normalize it very much as in [21–23]. The figure shows, that the likelihood method is inferior
to even the approximate Bayesian method. For good data, i.e. r → 0, the likelihood method
yields confidence intervals that are — in the light of the criterion — too wide. For data of
marginal quality (r ≈ 1), it yields no reliable confidence intervals, because the frequency of
successes is considerably lower than the prescribed confidence.
SUMMARY
We have defined objective Bayesian statistics by supplementing the Bayesian argument
with the requirement that it should yield “objectively correct” confidence intervals. A
theorem by Stein — which can be found in the published mathematical literature [14] but
which seems to be unknown in practice — shows that this requirement can be met provided
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that the conditional probability p(x|ξ)dx posses the symmetry (3) defined by a Lie group.
By way of an example we have extended objective Bayesian statistics to the common case
in which p(x|ξ)dx does not have an exact symmetry. In the example, a complex event
x = (x1, . . . , xn) is broken down into elementary ones xi among which there is at least
one — say x1 — whose conditional probability p(x1|ξ)dx possesses a symmetry (3). It is
used to define the prior µ(ξ). This has been termed approximate Bayesian procedure. We
have shown numerically that the AB procedure is superior to the popular likelihood method
as judged by the objectivity of the deduced confidence intervals.
Note that the arguments presented here amount to a reconciliation of the subjective and
frequentist interpretations of probability. The Bayesian argument attributes a distribution
to an object, i.e. the hypothesis, which is given by Nature once and for all. This is justified
by interpreting probability distributions as a representation of subjective knowledge on that
object. The frequentist interpretation insists that a probability distribution must be verifi-
able — at least in a gedanken experiment — as a frequency distribution that occurs in some
stochastic process. We have described a gedanken experiment to generate a distribution of
Bayesian confidence intervals from data that are conditioned by a fixed true value of the
hypothesis. The rate of success, i.e. of the true value lying inside the confidence interval,
turns out to be independent of the true value, moreover the rate of success is equal to the
confidence prescribed in the Bayesian procedure — if the conditional distribution possesses
the symmetry (3) and if the prior is chosen to be the right Haar measure. Then the Bayesian
inference is found reasonable from a frequentist’s point of view.
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